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Casenote

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.
v. PSKS, Inc.: Loosening the Belt on
Price Fixing

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Leegin Creative Leather Products,Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,' the United
States Supreme Court overturned almost a century of antitrust
precedent by overruling Dr.Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co. 2 and holding that vertical minimum resale price maintenance
agreements were no longer per se illegal but would now be governed by
the rule of reason.3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. ("Leegin") is a manufacturer
and distributor of women's accessories, including products under the
"Brighton" brand name. Leegin preferred to sell its products through
small retail boutiques so that its customers received individualized

1.
2.
3.

127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
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customer service. PSKS, Inc. ("PSKS") operated Kay's Kloset, a women's
apparel store that sold Brighton goods. Kay's Kloset began purchasing
Brighton goods from Leegin in 1995. Brighton was the store's key brand
and accounted for as much as fifty percent of its profits.4
In 1997 Leegin began the "Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion
Policy" (the "Policy") and sent a letter to its retailers to inform them of
the Policy.5 Leegin created the Policy to provide Brighton retailers with
adequate margins, thereby enabling them to provide valuable customer
service for Brighton products. The Policy was designed to stop retailers
from discounting Brighton products, that the manufacturer believed to
be damaging to the products' reputation.6 In 1998 Leegin began the
"Heart Store Program," a marketing strategy which required its retailers
to sell Brighton products at Leegin's suggested prices. 7 As part of the
Policy, Leegin would not sell Brighton products to retailers who sold
them for less than Leegin's suggested prices. Kay's Kloset became a
Heart Store the same year but lost that status soon after, due to the
store's unsatisfactory appearance. However, the store continued to sell
Brighton products and even increased its sales of Brighton goods. In
2002 Leegin learned that Kay's Kloset was discounting its Brighton
products, and Leegin requested a return to the suggested price. When
Kay's Kloset continued to discount Brighton products, Leegin refused to
sell products to the store. Losing the Brighton brand substantially
decreased the revenue of Kay's Kloset.'
PSKS filed an action against Leegin in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging that Leegin had violated
antitrust laws by entering into an agreement with retailers to charge
fixed prices. PSKS alleged that, among other things, Leegin's Heart
Store Program demonstrated the unlawful agreement. Leegin tried to
introduce expert testimony to describe the procompetitive effects of its
pricing policy. However, the district court excluded the expert testimony.? The court relied upon Dr.Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co.,' ° in which the United States Supreme Court held that
agreements to fix minimum prices were per se illegal."
Leegin
contended that its marketing policy was lawful under the Sherman

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710-11 (2007).
Id. at 2711.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2712.
220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Id. at 408.
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Act 2 as a "unilateral pricing policy."13 However, the jury found for
PSKS and awarded it $1.2 million. The district court trebled the
damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 4 and entered a $3,975,000.80
judgment against Leegin. 15
Leegin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 6 On appeal, Leegin admitted to entering into "vertical pricefixing agreements with its retailers" but argued that the rule of reason
was the correct standard to apply, not the per se rule. 7 The court of
appeals, also following Dr.Miles, rejected this argument and held that
the district court had not abused its discretion by excluding testimony
of procompetitive justifications that were immaterial under the per se
rule.' 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a 5-4 decision,
overruled Dr. Miles.'9
In doing so, the Court held that vertical
minimum resale price maintenance agreements are to be evaluated
under the rule of reason.2 °
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Sherman Act and Restraints on Trade

In 1890 Congress enacted the Sherman Act,2 ' which prohibits
"[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States."22 The statute, however, does not define "restraint of trade."23
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp. ,24 stated that Congress intended for courts to interpret the Act "in the light of its common-law background." 25 In the
same opinion, Justice Stevens also stated that because the plain
language of the statute bans "every" contract restraining trade, a "literal
reading of the statute would outlaw the entire body of private contract

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2710, 2712.
Id. at 2710.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
Id.
Id.
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
Id. at 736-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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law."2" Thus, the United States Supreme Court has long interpreted
the statute to apply only to "unreasonable restraints."2 7
Two standards developed for determining whether agreements violated
the Sherman Act: the rule of reason and per se illegality.2" Under the
rule of reason, courts consider several factors in determining the
lawfulness of the restraint, taking into account all of the circumstances
surrounding the restraint and its effect on competition.29 Such factors
may include: (1) the number of manufacturers participating;30 (2) the
source of the restraint; and (3) the market power of the entity.
In contrast, under the standard of per se illegality, courts presume
that certain agreements and practices are illegal regardless of their
effect on the market.3 ' Because of the severity of the standard, a
restraint "must have 'manifestly anticompetitive' effects" to justify
establishing a per se prohibition. 2 Over time, the Court's definition of
what is "anticompetitive" has changed so that practices that were once
per se illegal are now evaluated under the rule of reason.3 Under the
modern interpretation, courts determine that restraints are manifestly
anticompetitive when they "would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output."3'
Thus, the Court is
reluctant to use the per se rule when it is not certain of the effects a
restraint may have.35 Presently, the rule of reason is the accepted
standard for determining whether a practice violates the Sherman Act's
prohibition against restraint of trade.36
B.

Historically Significant Case Law

In 1911 the Supreme Court ruled in Dr Miles Medical Co. v.John D.
Park & Sons Co. 37 that an agreement between a manufacturer and its
distributors to establish minimum resale prices was per se illegal under

26. Id. at 736.
27. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
28. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13 (2007).
29. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1963).
30. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719-20.
31. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 262.
32. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 50 (1977)). Horizontal agreements among competitors still fall into this category.
Id.
33. See GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 59; State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 18; Bus. Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. at 724.
34. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 723).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2712 (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)).
37. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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section 1 of the Sherman Act.38 In Dr. Miles, a manufacturer attempted
to fix prices for its products both at the wholesale and retail levels,
thereby establishing minimum prices for all subsequent purchasers.39
The Court determined that, in doing so, the manufacturer had eliminated all competition and thereby restrained trade.4 ° The Court looked to
common law and reasoned that "a general restraint upon alienation is
ordinarily invalid."4' Consumer welfare and the public interest must
be considered first.42 The Court reasoned that after a manufacturer
sold its products, the public was "entitled to whatever advantage may be
derived from competition in the subsequent traffic."43 Therefore, the
Court held that price-fixing was per se unlawful under both the common
law and the Sherman Act.44
In the wake of Dr. Miles, manufacturers tried to find ways to
circumvent the holding and set resale prices. Eight years later in United
States v. Colgate & Co.,41 the Supreme Court effectively created a large
loophole in its holding in Dr.Miles.46 In Colgate a manufacturer urged
its distributors to sell at its suggested prices and refused to continue to
sell to anyone who did not. However, the manufacturer never specifically
executed a contract. 47 The Court determined that without a contract,
the distributors were not bound to sell at a fixed price, even if the
manufacturer could refuse to sell to them.4" The Court acknowledged
that manufacturers had a right to refuse to sell to any wholesaler or
retailer they chose. 49 Thus, a manufacturer could specify a resale price
and refuse to sell to a dealer who would not comply."0 The ruling in
Colgate effectively created a dichotomy in the law such that price-fixing
by contract was illegal per se, while the same conduct performed without
a specific agreement was lawful.5
Over the next sixty years, Congress's view on the purpose of antitrust
laws shifted. In an attempt to protect small businesses, Congress passed

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 409.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 409.
Id.
250 U.S. 300 (1919).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 307.
Id.
See id. at 307-08.
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the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act 2 in 1937, which allowed states to
enact laws to make vertical price restraints legal. 3 Then in 1952,
Congress passed the McGuire Act,5" which "expanded the exemption to
permit vertical price-setting agreements between a manufacturer and a
distributor to be enforced against other distributors not involved in the
agreement."55
Consequently, in states that allowed resale price
maintenance, prices were about twenty percent higher than in states
where it was illegal.5" Then in 1975, Congress passed the Consumer
Goods Pricing Act,5" which repealed both the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade
Act and the McGuire Act. 5' The Act "did not codify the rule of per se
illegality for vertical price restraints," but "rescinded statutory provisions that made them per se legal."5 9
Starting in the 1970s, the Supreme Court began to trend away from
employing per se rulings toward using the rule of reason standard. In
1967, for example, the Court in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co.60 addressed the question of whether it was legal for a manufacturer
to restrict access to its product to certain retailers in specified territories.6 The Court held that when the manufacturer no longer retained
title in the product, the restraint was per se unlawful. 2 Ten years
later, in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., ' the Supreme
Court overruled Schwinn and held that the rule of reason governed all
vertical nonprice restraints.'
The Court mentioned some benefits of
vertical restrictions-such as compensating for market imperfections and
enabling entrance into new markets-but maintained that manufacturers had an interest in encouraging intrabrand competition (the
competition between retailers of the same brand).65 The Court concluded that a "departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based
upon demonstrable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line
drawing."66

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2723.
Pub. L. No. 82-542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (repealed 1975).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2723.
Id. at 2728 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Pub. L. No. 91-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2723.
Id. at 2724.
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 382.
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 54-56.
Id. at 58-59.
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The Supreme Court continued to broaden its standard of evaluating
vertical restraints. In 1984, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp.,6 7 the Court distinguished between independent actions taken by
a manufacturer (governed by the rule of reason), concerted action
between a manufacturer and distributors on nonprice restrictions
(governed by the rule of reason), and agreements to fix prices (classified,
at that time, as per se illegal). 8 The Court held that in establishing
a section 1 Sherman Act violation, a plaintiff must provide "evidence
that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by the
manufacturer and distributor." 9 Significantly, while the Court was
hearing Monsanto, the Solicitor General filed a brief for the United
States as amicus curiae advocating that the Court overrule its decision
in Dr. Miles.v° Not faced with that particular issue, the Court declined
to reach a decision on Dr. Miles at that time."' Justice Brennan,
however, chose to write a separate concurring opinion solely to emphasize that Dr. Miles should continue to be upheld due to its seventy-year
precedent and Congress's approval during that period.72
Following Monsanto, the Court continued to expand the scope of the
rule of reason standard. In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.,7 the Court held that "a vertical restraint is not
illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price
levels."74 Based on GTE Sylvania and Monsanto, the Court reiterated
that there was a "presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard" for
vertical restraints.75 It acknowledged the procompetitive effects of
vertical restraints and indicated that requiring the per se rule could
cause manufacturers "to forgo legitimate and competitively useful
conduct."76
The trend toward employing the rule of reason was also evident in the
Court's treatment of maximum resale price maintenance. In Albrecht v.
Herald Co.,77 the Supreme Court held that setting a maximum resale
price was a per se illegal restraint on trade. 7' However, the Court later

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

465 U.S. 752 (1984).
Id. at 763.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 761 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 769 (Brennan, J., concurring).
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 728.
390 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 153-54.
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overruled Albrecht in State Oil Co. v. Khan,79 holding that vertical
maximum resale price fixing was not per se illegal but governed by the
rule of reason.80 In overruling Albrecht, the Court looked to its
rationale in GTE Sylvania to explain that "[a]lthough the rule of
Albrecht has been in effect for some time, the inquiry we must undertake
requires considering 'the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical
distributional restraints in the American economy today.'"8 " Although
the Court continued to affirm its holding in Dr.Miles, applying per se
illegality to agreements setting minimum resale prices, it observed that
the majority of antitrust claims were evaluated under the rule of
reason.8 2 The Court also stated the purpose of antitrust law as
"protect[ing] interbrand competition." 3 Because vertical maximum
resale price restraints lowered prices to the benefit of consumers, per se
invalidation was not justified.'
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

A.

The Majority Opinion
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy evaluated the
potential economic effects of vertical minimum resale price agreements,
determined what would be the appropriate standard to apply if the
Court were starting anew, and explained why the Court could overrule
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co."8 and apply the
appropriate rule of reason standard. 86 Justice Kennedy was joined by
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 7
The Court first examined the procompetitive justifications for resale
price maintenance.88 In doing so, the Court noted that fixing minimum
resale prices could stimulate interbrand competition (the competition
between different manufacturers' brands of a similar product).8 9
Likewise, it could potentially increase options in price and service levels
for consumers.90 Fixing minimum resale prices, according to the Court,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

522 U.S. 3 (1997).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 21-22 (quoting GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 53 n.21).
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 15.

Id.
220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
Id. at 2710.
Id. at 2714-16.
Id. at 2715.
Id.
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could also prevent "free riding," which occurs when a discounter takes
advantage of another's services or reputation, thereby diminishing the
other's return and discouraging further investments.91 The Court noted
further that minimum price maintenance could facilitate market entry
and competition based on services instead of price.2 Finally, the Court
reasoned that setting a minimum resale price and allowing retailers to
determine the services they would provide could be more efficient than
requiring manufacturers to contract for specific services.
Next, the Court examined the anticompetitive effects of minimum
resale price restraints.9 4 The Court noted that minimum price restraints could enable a manufacturer to earn monopoly profits, create a
manufacturer's cartel, or cause a manufacturer to lose its incentive to
provide cheaper prices to consumers. 95 The restraints could enable
retailers to form a retailer's cartel or to simply raise their profits rather
than to provide extra services or consumer benefits.9 Thus, a threat
of abuse by a powerful manufacturer or retailer could exist. 97 The
Court explained that horizontal cartels would remain per se illegal and
that vertical agreements to facilitate a horizontal cartel would be held
unlawful under the rule of reason.9" Considering the strict criteria of
the per se rule, the Court determined that vertical price maintenance
provided enough procompetitive advantages to make the rule of per se
illegality inappropriate.99
Although the Court acknowledged that allowing minimum price
restraints could increase prices, it reasoned that anticompetitive effects
must not be determined by price alone but by also evaluating anticompetitive conduct. 00 The rule of reason standard was "designed and used
to eliminate anticompetitive transactions from the market."'0 ' The
Court recognized that it had allowed the rule of reason standard to apply
to vertical nonprice restraints even though those restraints also carried
the risk of increasing prices.'0 2 Additionally, the Court reasoned that
in attempting to avoid the harsh per se rule, manufacturers may have

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 2715-16.
Id. at 2716.
Id.
Id. at 2716-17.
Id. at 2716.

96. Id. at 2717.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2717-18.
100.
101.

Id. at 2718.
Id. at 2720.

102. Id. at 2718.
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resorted to costly alternatives, in which case removing the per se rule
would allow for lower costs, especially because manufacturers have no
incentive to overcompensate their retailers.1"3 Moreover, according to
the Court, manufacturers' interests should align with those of consumers
1°4
and should thus naturally act to protect prices from rising too high.
The Court also stressed that the purpose of antitrust laws is to
encourage interbrand competition, which in turn should have the effect
of lowering prices. 0 5
Based on the analysis above, the Court determined that if it were
considering this case as an original matter, it would choose the rule of
reason standard and not per se illegality.'
The Court reasoned that
courts can use the rule of reason to offset any potential anticompetitive
risks. 0'
Additionally, the Court determined that administrative
convenience did not justify maintaining the per se rule of illegality,
especially when the per se rule could be counterproductive and lead to
increased costs and litigation.' 8
Finally, the Court determined that it had the power to overrule Dr.
Miles,'" even while acknowledging several policies in support of stare
decisis, such as the importance of having and maintaining settled
law."0 Although stare decisis generally carries more weight when
interpreting statutes, the Court reasoned that it carried less weight
when applied to the Sherman Act because the Sherman Act is a
"common-law statute," which "adapts to modern understanding and
greater experience.""' Additionally, cases can be overruled "'when2
subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings.'""1
The Court acknowledged that its common law approach had substantially altered the rules governing vertical restraints from the strict
interpretation that was employed in 1911 when Dr. Miles was decided." 3 Because Dr. Miles was based on "'formalistic'" line drawing
rather than "'demonstrable economic effect,'" the Court rejected the

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 2718-19.
Id. at 2715.
Id. at 2720.

107. Id.
108.
109.

Id. at 2718.
Id. at 2720.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112.
113.

Id. at 2721 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).
Id.
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reasoning as incongruent with its current approach. 4 The Sherman
Act "'invokes the common law itself, . . .not merely the static content
that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890. ' 115 Thus, the
Court emphasized that the interpretation of the common law of 1911
was immaterial to the issues of the modern economy, and that the Court
should not be held to that standard." 6
Additionally, the Court determined that its decisions in Colgate, GTE
Sylvania, Business Electronics, Monsanto, and Khan had effectively
narrowed the reach of Dr. Miles such that the recent treatment of other
vertical restraints now justified overruling Dr. Miles." 7 In these cases,
the Court determined the lawfulness of the restraints based on their
procompetitive effects." 8 Because procompetitive effects were sufficient to warrant overruling Schwinn and Albrecht, the Court reasoned
that retaining Dr. Miles could call into question the cases that overruled
them, GTE Sylvania and Khan, as well as other vertical restraint
cases. 1 9
Furthermore, alternatives to price-fixing could be less
efficient, thereby costlier, and could act to impair competition and
consumer welfare. 20 For instance, Colgate granted manufacturers the
"right to refuse to deal with retailers that do not follow its suggested
prices," but the risk that a "jury might conclude its unilateral policy was
really a vertical agreement... has led, rational manufacturers to take
wasteful measures."' 2 ' Thus, maintaining the per se rule did not
create the economic effect that was originally desired.'2 2
Additionally, the Court concluded that because "Congress intended § 1
[of the Sherman Act] to give courts the ability 'to develop governing
principles of law' in the common-law tradition," Congress's failure to
codify the rule in Dr Miles was a sign that the Court was free to adopt
the rule of reason, which was more appropriate to modern times and
circumstances. 23 Furthermore, because resale price maintenance was
legal from 1935 to 1975 and manufacturers had continued to set

114. Id. at 2714 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59
(1977)).
115. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 732 (1988)); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
116. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714.
117. Id. at 2721-22.
118. Id. at 2722.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2723.
123. Id. at 2724 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643
(1981)).
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minimum resale prices through nonprice restraints, the Court determined that the reliance interests in this case were not sufficient to
require the Court to continue upholding the per se rule in Dr Miles.' 24
Therefore, the Court overruled Dr.Miles and held that the
125 rule of reason
would govern vertical minimum resale price restraints.

B. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
dissented. 12 In his dissent, Justice Breyer discussed the economic
impact of minimum resale agreements and the criteria necessary to
overrule precedent. 127 Justice Breyer maintained that although the
Court may have found a different standard appropriate if it were
deciding the case originally, there was insufficient
justification to
128
overrule a precedent that was almost a century old.
In considering the potential economic effects of minimum price
restraints and the arguments for and against the per se rule, Justice
Breyer agreed with the majority opinion that minimum price restraints
could provide potential benefits, such as facilitating new market entry,
causing greater interbrand competition, and helping to prevent free
riding. 2 1 Justice Breyer also agreed that minimum resale price
restraints could cause serious anticompetitive effects. 3 ° For example,
minimum resale price restraints could affect dealers by decreasing or
eliminating price competition, by hindering "dealers from responding to
changes in demand," by "wastefully" attracting too many resources to an
industry that lacked demand, and by "stifling the development of new,
more efficient modes of retailing."'
Allowing manufacturers to set
minimum resale prices could also foster collusion between manufacturers, reduce incentive to lower wholesale prices, and prevent price
competition. 3 2 Furthermore, Justice Breyer pointed to empirical data
that provided evidence of the anticompetitive effects of minimum resale
price restraints, especially in regard to increased consumer prices.' 33
The Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act' and the McGuire Act 135 permit-

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 2724-25.
Id. at 2725.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2725-37.
Id. at 2728.
Id. at 2727.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2727-28.
Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975).
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ted states to allow minimum resale price-fixing. 136 Thirty-six states
by
made this kind of price-fixing lawful, and prices effectively increased
37
nineteen to twenty-seven percent in those states during that time.
Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer highlighted the significance of
administering the standard that applies to minimum resale price
agreements. 13' He pointed out that the Court should look at how often
the problem was likely to occur and how difficult it would be for courts
to distinguish a beneficial restraint from a prohibited restraint on
trade.'3 9 Under the rule of reason, it is difficult to determine when a
restraint is "serious enough to warrant legal protection." 4 ° Indeed,
Justice Breyer noted that analyzing the factors under the rule of reason
Using the rule
would be abstract, technical, and time-consuming.'"
of reason standard could also increase litigation, and courts left without
guidance would likely make mistakes.'4 2 Justice Breyer was also
concerned that enforcement would be more difficult without a bright-line
rule and that enterprises143might be more tempted to hedge toward
anticompetitive practices.
Justice Breyer also disagreed with the majority regarding Congress's
intentions.'4 4 He noted that Congress had repealed the McGuire and
Miller-Tydings Acts in response to urging by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission to remove states' discretion in
applying the Dr. Miles per se rule. 41 According to Justice Breyer,
Congress "fully understood, and consequently intended" for minimum
resale price maintenance to be per se illegal. 46 Moreover, for the last
century, Congress had been aware of Dr.Miles and never overturned the
Breyer determined, the Court was not
per se rule; therefore, Justice
4
1
now.1
so
doing
in
justified
Additionally, Justice Breyer contended that the repeal of the McGuire
and Miller-Tydings Acts established public reliance such that the case
should not be overruled unless a substantial change had taken place

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Pub. L. No. 82-542, 66 Stat. 632 (1952) (repealed 1975).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2727-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2730-31.
Id. at 2730.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2731.
See id. at 2731-32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2726.
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since that time. 14 According to Justice Breyer, the potential benefits
of vertical minimum resale price maintenance that were argued before
the Court were not new, and the American economy had not changed
such that overruling Dr. Miles was justified. 149 Justice Breyer determined that, if anything, "[cloncentration in retailing has increased,"
which means that price maintenance could make it more difficult for
discount competitors to obtain market share. 50 Thus, there was "no
ground for abandoning a well-established antitrust rule."' 5 '
According to Justice Breyer, a century's worth of precedent was bound
He
by considerable reliance and should not be overturned lightly.'
deemed that this Court was unjustified in doing so in this case. 153 To
support his contention, Justice Breyer analyzed six factors that the
Court had previously employed for determining whether to overrule a
case 5 4 and concluded that the majority in Leegin did not satisfy a
single one.' 55 Additionally, Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority
that invoking common law gave the Court the authority to overrule
Leegin because "[clommon-law courts rarely overrule[d] well-established
earlier rules outright," but instead they "over time issue decisions that
1 56
gradually eroded the scope and effect of the rule in question."
Furthermore, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, unlike the
Court, are "well-equipped to gather empirical evidence outside the
to Justice Breyer, such
context of a single case." 57 Therefore, according
58
a decision should have been left to them.1

148. Id. at 2732.
149. Id. at 2732-33.
150. Id. at 2733-34.
151. Id. at 2734.
152. Id. at 2731.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2734-37. Factors that supported overruling a case included: (1) determining
that a case was "decided wrongly only a reasonably short time ago"; (2) determining that
a "legal regime" is "unworkable"; and (3) determining that "a decision unsettles the law."
Id. On the other hand, factors that supported upholding a decision included: (1) applying
stare decisis more "rigidly" in statutory interpretation than in constitutional cases; (2)
determining that the case "involves property rights or contract rights, where reliance

interests are involved"; and (3) determining that "a rule of law has become embedded in
our national culture." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2737.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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IMPLICATIONS

Because the rule of reason is so widely used in other areas of antitrust
jurisprudence, Congress is not likely to supersede the Court's holding by
statute. As a result of the holding in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,"' courts must now weigh a minimum resale price
agreement's procompetitive effects against its anticompetitive effects to
determine whether a restraint is unlawful. The rule of reason standard
can theoretically continue to further the Sherman Act's goal of prohibiting harmful restraints on trade, but in practice, the standard has
significant hurdles to overcome.
Allowing manufacturers the right to set minimum prices can help
alleviate the problem of free riding, which occurs when one retailer
benefits from another retailer's investment in providing services to
consumers, such as building a showroom for demonstrations. The
retailer that provides the services increases its overhead, but consumers
use the services to learn about the product. The retailer that does not
provide the services is able to discount its prices, due to lower overhead,
and the consumers then purchase from that retailer. In such cases,
service-providing retailers lose sales to discounters and may lose
incentive to invest in additional customer services. Free riding can
eventually cause an overall decrease in the quality and availability of
services in the market. Such a decrease in services may negatively
impact the consumer, the industry, and healthy customer-oriented
competition. Consequently, customers may be better served when
pricing is fixed to adequately cover the additional cost of added-value
services that improve consumers' ability to make appropriate and
educated choices.
Consumer prices are likely to increase as they did when minimum
resale price agreements were lawful under state law. Setting minimum
resale prices restricts intrabrand competition, which causes prices to be
higher than they would without the restraint. For example, without
minimum price restraints, retailers often compete to sell the same
product by offering it at different prices. However, minimum resale
price restraints can stifle efficiency incentives and restrict retailers'
ability to discount products. As a result, higher prices may be supported
unjustifiably if added-value services are not rendered by retailers.
On the other hand, when retailers cannot compete through price, they
frequently look for other ways to compete, which can be to the benefit of
the consumer. Competition through quality of service can be especially
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effective in certain industries, such as technology industries, where
knowledge of the product and demonstrations of its benefits and features
are important. Consumers, for example, are much more likely to buy a
computer, even if the price is higher, if they are provided with information and a hands-on demonstration than they would be if these services
were not provided. A problem may arise, however, if retailers do not
provide the added services as the manufacturer had intended. In such
a situation, the minimum price restraint would only act to keep prices
higher without the extra benefits.
Without offsetting competition, minimum price restraints are likely to
have an anticompetitive effect. In the present United States economy,
many industries are concentrated such that there are few manufacturers, and thus less interbrand competition exists to offset a minimum
price restraint. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, "[i]ncreased
concentration among manufacturers increases the likelihood that
producer-originated resale price maintenance will prove more prevalent
today than in years past, and more harmful." 6 °
The new standard also comes at an additional procedural cost. The
cost of litigating under the rule of reason will be much higher than
under the per se rule. Unlike the per se rule, the rule of reason
standard will require expert testimony and analysis of the market with
and without the restraint to determine its effects. Thus, litigation will
be much more complex. Furthermore, by not giving courts specific
guidelines, many variations and inconsistencies are likely to develop in
how cases are determined.
Enforcement may also become more difficult. Much of the danger of
minimum resale price maintenance depends on the motivation behind
the restraint. If the manufacturer initiates the restraint, the price
restraint is likely to be beneficial because it is in the manufacturer's best
interest to keep prices at a minimum to increase its sales. On the other
hand, if retailers initiate the price restraint, the restraint is more likely
to be an effort to limit competition and increase profits. A problem
arises in distinguishing minimum prices that encourage added value and
benefit consumer welfare from ones that have a negative or unjust effect.
Whether minimum resale price restraints will benefit or harm
consumer welfare depends heavily upon the integrity of the market. By
changing the standard of review, the Court has allowed manufacturers
more freedom within the market. Manufacturers can now use minimum
resale price restraints as a tool to prevent free riding and to provide
quality services for their products. The new standard also allows courts

160.
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to step in to protect consumers from extreme or unjustified market
pricing when the restraint proves to be detrimental to the consumer.
CRYSTAL J. CLARK

